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Robert Kurzban is a consortium of modules based at the University of Pennsylvania. They (those modules, or some subset of them) have recently written a very interesting book about self-deception and hypocrisy. You (whoever you are) are reading a review of that book. 

In brief, the consortium’s thesis is this. If the mind is conceived as a unitary psychological entity – a unitary, singular, indivisible self – then the notion of self-deception is deliciously paradoxical (How could one and the same entity believe two contradictory propositions simultaneously? How could one and the same entity be both the subject and the object of a particular deception?). If, however, the mind is conceived as a modular apparatus, an entity composed of numerous functionally specialised sub-entities, then such paradoxes dissolve. ‘Self-deception’, on the Kurzban consortium’s modular conception, involves neither self nor deception, but is just a misnomer for scenarios where 1) certain parts of the mind – but not others - generate systematically distorted representations; and 2) different parts of the mind thereby represent mutually inconsistent information.

The related problems of self-control (why do people lock their refrigerator doors at night?) and hypocrisy (how is it that people often fail to practise what they preach?) yield to similar analyses (the parts of the mind that lock the door are not the same parts that want to open it at midnight; the parts that preach are not the same parts that practise). And the fact that the modules in the Kurzban consortium (henceforth, ‘Kurzban’, ‘he’ or ‘him’, though it should be stressed that this is just for rhetorical ease) view the mind as not merely a modular system, but as an evolved modular system, enables ‘him’ to tell a comprehensive story that encompasses both proximate issues of psychological architecture and ultimate issues of biological function. In brief, humans are hypocritical and ‘self-deceptive’ because of the way human minds are constructed, and human minds are constructed this way because this arrangement helped ancestral humans to differentially negotiate social and non-social environments.

On the whole, ‘I’ found Kurzban’s arguments very congenial. The broad outlines, of course, are familiar – the notion that the mind has internal structure is explicit in many psychological traditions, from Freud to Fodor, and the idea that this structure evolved to solve recurrent problems in ancestral environments is a foundational assumption of evolutionary psychology. Kurzban has obviously aimed his book at a popular audience - he hopes that by the end readers ‘will come to have a fundamentally different view of human nature’ (p. 22), but few readers of this journal will be unacquainted with the modular view that he espouses. Nevertheless, the book brims with vivid examples and effective intuition pumps (I particularly liked his metaphor of modules as smartphone applications for the mind), and there are more than enough novel arguments and insights to interest and enlighten specialists. I will pick up on just a few points here.

My first point concerns the scenario in which two parts of the mind represent mutually inconsistent information. To illustrate this state of affairs Kurzban reviews a range of psychological and neuropsychological phenomena, including optical illusions, split-brain patients, phantom limbs and blindsight.  These examples are intrinsically fascinating and Kurzban does a fine job of using them to demolish the ‘unitary’ view of the mind. However, he neglects to mention some especially compelling recent demonstrations of information encapsulation. For example, Johansson and colleagues (Johansson, Hall, Sikström & Olsson, 2005; Johansson, Hall, Sikström, Tärning & Lind, 2006; Hall, Johansson, Tärning, Sikström & Deutgen, 2010) have demonstrated a phenomenon they call choice blindness. Participants in their studies are asked to make a binary decision (e.g., to select which of two faces they find most attractive, or to indicate which of two varieties of jam they prefer the taste of), and to offer reasons for this decision. After the participants make their choice, but before they offer their reasons, the experimenters use sleight-of-hand trickery to covertly exchange the option the participants didn’t select for the option they did select. Whereas Nisbett and Wilson (1977; Wilson and Nisbett, 1978) showed that people in certain situations will confabulate justifications for their decisions (thus demonstrating that the decision-making process is sometimes walled off from the modules that orchestrate verbal explanations of it), Johansson and colleagues have found that many of their participants are quite prepared to offer justifications for decisions they did not even make.

The above point pertains to psychological architecture, but demonstrating that the mind is structured so as to permit cross-modular informational inconsistencies is only part of Kurzban’s project. As befits his evolutionary orientation, a second major focus is on how ultimate evolutionary forces sustain intermodular inconsistencies and intramodular processing distortions. Here Kurzban has many interesting things to say. Like a number of other theorists (e.g., Haselton & Buss, 2000; Haselton & Nettle, 2006), he thinks that certain modules are designed to generate systematically distorted representations. Unlike some others, however, he doesn’t think that humans are the ‘intended’ consumers of their own distorted representations; or rather, he thinks that consumption of one’s own distorted representations is only adaptive insofar as these representations are then regurgitated for consumption by others. In Kurzban’s view, distorted representations can have a strategic value in social settings, where they can play a role (akin to propaganda) in manipulating the representations of others to one’s advantage. In non-social settings, however, veridical representations are always preferable. Thus if a tendency to systematically overestimate one’s ability to perform a certain task is adaptive, this is not because it increases the chances of success at that task, but because it increases the confidence that others have about one’s ability to perform the task - perhaps making one appear a more valuable social partner.

If Kurzban is right that systematically distorted representations can be adaptive in certain social contexts but that veridical representations are always adaptive in non-social contexts, then this explains at least some instances of mutually inconsistent – and mutually encapsulated – representations. The distorted representations may come into play when public relations are paramount and one’s reputation is at stake, but otherwise veridical representations should always orchestrate behaviour. Both representations are useful in different situations, but to prevent cross-contamination they may need to be sealed off from one another.

I have two points to make about these ideas. The first concerns the overlap (which Kurzban acknowledges) between his ideas and those of Robert Trivers, who has famously suggested that a capacity for self-deception has evolved because it facilitates the deception of others (e.g., Trivers, 2000; von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). I think that both Kurzban and Trivers would agree with the following claims: 1) The ability to misinform others is adaptive; 2) The propagation of such misinformation is a risky and effortful business, most safely and effectively accomplished through the intermediary of a gullible mouthpiece. As far as I can see, the key difference between them is that for Trivers self-deception does involve some element of inner deception – some inner deceiver misleads the mouthpiece, and the mouthpiece then guilelessly misinforms other people. For Kurzban, however, there is no deception in self-deception. The job of the mouthpiece in his scheme is certainly to propagate misinformation, but his mouthpiece generates this misinformation itself by processing reality in a systematically distorted fashion – by being ‘strategically wrong’. For Kurzban, modules that generate distorted representations have no access to veridical representations, and do not receive input from the modules containing the veridical representations: ‘[I]t’s not like one module is pulling something over on another module’ (p. 130).

My second point concerns the possibility that happiness, or self-esteem, has some biological benefit. Kurzban doubts this. He sees that certain systematically distorted representations – inflated perceptions of one’s prowess or prospects, for example – might enhance happiness. However, he argues that evolution can only ‘see’ the effects of behaviour, whereas happiness itself has no behavioural effects. I think it is possible to dispute both of these claims, but here I focus on the former. Kurzban insists that ultimate explanations of modular functions ‘…must refer, ultimately, to effects outside the body’ (p. 141, his emphasis). But why must this be the case? I agree with him that natural selection does not ‘care’ about happiness for its own sake, but only insofar as happiness promotes survival and reproduction. But survival is not just a function of behaviour. Whether or not happiness leads individuals to engage in more adaptive behaviours (with effects ‘outside’ the body), happiness will presumably be selected for to the extent that it sustains and enhances physical health, for example by constraining cardiovascular and neuroendocrine responses to stressful circumstances (see Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, Bower & Gruenewald, 2000). Here the effects are ‘inside’ the body, and are not ‘behavioural’ in the ordinary sense. But evolution can surely ‘see’ them.

So, I think Kurzban’s insistence that systematically distorted representations can only conceivably be adaptive in the context of social strategy may be unnecessarily strict. Nevertheless, I thought his discussions of these and many related issues were instructive and valuable, although some of his swipes at social psychologists seemed a bit unfair. Kurzban compares social psychology unfavourably to his own field of evolutionary psychology, and writes that the former ‘tends to be a collection of intuitive “just-so” stories’ that is ‘frequently not recognizable as science’ (p. 242, note 66). Given that evolutionary psychology is probably the branch of psychology that is most strongly associated with the ‘just-so’ story charge, this could seem a case of the pot calling the kettle black. Does Kurzban himself take care to avoid telling ‘just-so’ stories?

In a particularly interesting section towards the end of the book Kurzban outlines a provocative theory of sexual mores. He suggests that a pro-life stance on abortion is not based on concern for the rights of the embryo, but that it stems instead from an evolved proclivity to punish promiscuity in women. He writes that in ‘a species in which individuals can constrain others’ behavior with rules, you’d expect evolution to act to cause members of the species to favor rules that serve their reproductive interests even if they don’t know this is why they’re endorsing these rules.’ (p. 210, his emphasis). Because my reproductive interests are harmed by the promiscuity of other people (so long as they’re not being promiscuous with me), it makes evolutionary sense for me to support rules – like proscriptions on abortion, prostitution or recreational drug use - that curb promiscuous behaviour.

I find this argument ingenious and persuasive, even compelling. But note that one could quite easily tell a very different story here.  Consider that it’s not, strictly speaking, the promiscuity of other people that limits my relative reproductive success – it’s the sexual reproduction of other people. In a sense, then, the best thing I could do to advance my own reproductive interests would be to encourage other people to have abortions. Perhaps that’s what really underpins a pro-choice stance on abortion – not some laudable concern for the rights of a woman to choose, but an altogether darker agenda. People who support the rights of women to have abortions might just be trying to advance their own reproductive interests by encouraging the termination of their sexual rivals’ offspring.

So, is Kurzban’s account then merely a ‘just-so’ story? As I mentioned above, ‘just-so’ accusations are not infrequently leveled at evolutionary psychologists, but often they reveal more about the ability of critics to imagine how evolutionary conjectures might be falsified than about the scientific rigour of the psychologists in question. Fortunately, Kurzban suffers from no such failure of the imagination. It turns out that he and his colleagues have already begun to devise and conduct empirical tests of his theory of sexual mores. Kurzban, Dukes and Weeden (2010), for example, showed very recently (the study is not mentioned in Kurzban’s book) that attitudes toward sexual promiscuity are better predictors of attitudes toward recreational drug use than are abstract political commitments, and moreover that controlling for promiscuity attitudes virtually eliminates the relationship between abstract political commitments and drug attitudes. Further refinement is necessary (and it will be interesting to see whether similar results are observed in the case of abortion attitudes), but there is no doubting Kurzban’s commitment to falsifiability. Although I do think he might have been more charitable with his comments about social psychology, it seems clear that, with respect to theoretical and empirical rigour, he practises what he preaches.

On the other hand (and this is admittedly a petty point), I couldn’t help noticing that in his book he is not quite as careful in his use of pronouns as one might have expected, given his disdain for the unitary view of the mind and its linguistic residue. Indeed, some of his lapses into the language of ‘you’ and ‘I’ do not seem to reflect knowing rhetorical decisions, but arguably exemplify and perpetuate the conceptual confusion he is elsewhere at pains to expose and dispel. For example, early in the book he writes ‘This book is about all these different selves, some of which make you run, some of which make you lazy, some of which make you smart, and some of which keep you ignorant. You’re unaware of many of them’ (p. 6). Who, exactly, is he addressing here?
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